Why is the IAEA indifferent to Iran’s nuclear-security considerations?

Is the IAEA 100% dependent on the functioning of the European Union, the United States and other nuclear powers and international political security institutions, in particular permanent members of the Security Council, or, as defined, play an independent role? he does?

According to ISNA, the record of technical, legal and political behavior of the International Atomic Energy Agency has had many ups and downs from the beginning and in relation to member countries and Non-members have been different and at times contradictory. At the same time, the prevailing spirit of the international community and international law has tended not to allow this international nuclear institution to fall too much into the politics of the great powers and the nuclear power, and to the best of its ability within the framework of its primary duties and responsibilities. To maintain. Therefore, the impartiality, professionalism and independence of the International Atomic Energy Agency have always been emphasized and sensitively pursued by the members of this body and other technical and legal bodies.

At the same time, unfortunately, in historical periods and times, the Agency has not shown a good record in line with the above three principles. Or it has performed its duties under the influence of politics and the influence of one or more great powers. The IAEA, meanwhile, must at least maintain an independent program and an impartial approach to maintaining its nuclear weapons control, at least to maintain its professional and international credibility with its members.

The Israeli attack on the Ozirak power plant in Iraq in 1981, the issue of the UN presence in Iraq under Saddam and the search for nuclear weapons and the formation of a UN team to inspect Iraq in the sense that the IAEA failed to do its job properly. North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, Israel’s attack on the Deir ez-Zor power plant in Syria in 2007, and finally the sabotage of Iran’s nuclear facilities and the assassination of Iranian scientists and experts who have so far failed to do anything about it. Relate to Iran’s technical and intelligence assistance, or at least strongly condemn these actions against the peaceful nuclear facilities and activities of a member state by a regime with the support of other countries.

Over the past decade, our country’s nuclear facilities, experts, and scientists have been subjected to terrorist and cyber-attacks, some of which Israeli regime officials have openly attributed to; A regime that has nuclear activity and nuclear weapons but does not implement the NPT. Israel’s dangerous behavior against Iran over the past 20 years has progressed to the point that in an official letter in 2009, Iran called for a ban on attacking or threatening to attack nuclear facilities on the agenda of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s annual conference. And more than 100 countries around the world supported this vital, comprehensive and timely initiative of our country. Iran, meanwhile, submitted a resolution to the IAEA’s annual conference in 1990, which is listed as 533 in the IAEA documents. The resolution also considered an attack on a nuclear facility or even a threat to it contrary to the IAEA statute and international law. But despite these instructions, various attacks on Iran continued in the following years without the IAEA and the nuclear-weapon member states firmly and consistently condemning these behaviors and actions.

In the latest Israeli terrorist attacks and sabotage in Iran on July 2, it was announced that one of the buildings affiliated with the Atomic Energy Organization was severely damaged in the terrorist attacks around Karaj.

Mohammad Islami, the new head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, said in October that Israel had carried out a “terrorist attack” on a centrifuge facility in Karaj.

“The agency must first clarify its position on the incident,” he said.

He said details of the “significant incident” had reached the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and that the site of the Karaj nuclear facility and “especially the location of the IAEA surveillance cameras” had been destroyed during the attack.

Some time later, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requested the replacement of the Agency’s camera data storage card at Iran’s nuclear facilities, including the Karaj facility, which was under terrorist attack and was being rebuilt at the time. To replace, but Iran opposed the request.

Kazem Gharibabadi, the then representative of Iran to international organizations and the IAEA, stated in this regard: “Since the security and judicial investigations into the Tessa complex in Karaj are ongoing, the monitoring equipment of this complex will not be under technical service.” And Tessa cameras are not subject to an agreement between Iran and the Agency.

It should be noted that in order to reduce its obligations, Iran canceled the installation of memory cards for nuclear installation cameras within the framework of the Additional Protocol and Code 3.1, but due to the cooperative approach between Iran and the IAEA and avoiding Any kind of stealth scandal, Iran allowed the cameras to temporarily and voluntarily continue to record images, but the images were recorded in Iran until the reciprocal obligations were resumed.

Behrouz Kamalvandi, a spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization, told the media in October that Mr. Grossi and his colleagues were well aware that an agreement had been reached between Iran and the IAEA in the form of a joint statement, including surveillance equipment (cameras) at the Karaj complex. This reason is not due to the fact that the complex is still under security investigation as a result of the July sabotage. In both cases, while providing explanations by Mr. Islami, the negative response and Iran’s opposition in this regard has been announced.

“Tessa” facility in Karaj has been constructed and commissioned with the aim of producing new generation centrifuge machines. The facility resumed production of advanced centrifuge components in early September of this year, two months after the terrorist attack.

Meanwhile, Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia’s envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), responded to a report by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, who claimed that Iran had installed surveillance cameras in the facility, contrary to a September 12 statement. Tessa objected, stressing at a previous Board of Governors meeting that banning access to the Karaj facility was not a violation of safeguards agreements, but part of Tehran’s implementation of voluntary action.

Meanwhile, in a recent report released last week, the IAEA Director General reiterated his call for the installation of memory cards for surveillance cameras at the TSA Karaj facility, regarding the peaceful activities of Iran’s nuclear program, which are being prepared in two separate sections: Safeguards and Barjami.

According to Reuters, the Atomic Energy Agency stated in part of its report that nuclear inspectors still have limited access to the requested facilities in Iran, and also claimed that the IAEA would be able to install alternative cameras in the site’s workshop area. “Tessa” is not Karaj.

Mohammad Reza Ghaibi, Acting Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations in Vienna, referring to this part of the IAEA report, stated: Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA has been mentioned to provide some technical services in the agreed locations, and one case of disagreement over a location because Iran has stated that it is “conducting judicial and security investigations into terrorist operations in that location.” “Until the end of this process, the agency considers the access to this place beyond legal obligations.”

Ghaebi stated that Iran had “requested the IAEA to assist Iran in conducting this investigation.”

In this regard, an informed official told ISNA: “Since the” sabotage “operation was carried out in the Karaj facility in July, we did not allow the cameras to be re-installed.” Iran is closely investigating the incident.

He said the cameras involved in the accident should be carefully examined to what extent they were involved in sending information to the facility.

The informed official added that Iran has provided full information on this issue to the members of the Agency in an explanatory note.

It is clear that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), while seeking to maintain its professional credibility as the only international disarmament body in the world, is subject to the will of the major powers and the nuclear power, and this approach is very prominent in the Iran debate. Slowly.

This international technical and legal body calls for increased oversight and inspections of Iran, which is not required to implement the Additional Protocol, and its obligations are within the framework of comprehensive safeguards. Iran expects the IAEA and the Director-General to at least cooperate and allow investigations to prevent a recurrence of terrorist and cyber-attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities if they do not take legal or political action to condemn them and blame them. Iran to be completed in this regard. It is clear that Iran, as a true member of the IAEA, which has spent the most hours inspecting its nuclear facilities and activities under the magnifying glass of the great powers, is completely alone in this regard.

Continuation of media and political blackmail by the technical, nuclear and oversight arm of the IAEA Board undoubtedly limits the course of cooperation, especially between Iran and the IAEA on the eve of the resumption of the Vienna nuclear talks.

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